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JUVENILE LAW, BEFORE AND AFTER
THE ENTRANCE OF "PARENS PATRIAE"
NI L HowARD CoGAx*
The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be a great
help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of
juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its mean-
ing is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance.f
It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become
encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease
to provoke further analysis.tt
Until recently, juveniles have been excluded from the "con-
stitutional scheme" partly because "parens patriae" was thought
to give the state some special power over them.' The use of the
phrase somehow prevented the balancing we engage in when
state and individual interests are in conflict.
This article examines juvenile law in chancery (traditionally
called "infant law"), before and after "parens patriae" became
a part of it. It shows that "parens patriae" became a helpful
synonym for various state interests that the chancellor desired to
further: among them, the preservation of juvenile estates; the
furtherance of juvenile education; and the protection of juve-
niles from improper marriages. Hopefully, this paper puts to
rest the notion that "parens patriae" was or is anything more,
so that, when they are in conflict, state and juvenile interests
can be balanced as usual.
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professors George L
Haskins and James 0. Freedman of the University of Pennsylvania School of
Law for their assistance in the development of this article.
f In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
ft Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1917). (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1. Among the older American cases, compare Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9
(Pa. 1839); Roth and Boyle v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329 (1869); The
Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328
(1876) ; Petition of Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 (1882) with People ex rel. O'Connell
v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406
(1885). Among more recent cases, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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I. Tnm Emm-y CASES
In this section, I shall trace the early development of the
chancellor's jurisdiction over infants.
A. Late 14th to Early 15th Centuries
One of the king's feudal incidents from land held of him by
klight service was the wardship of his tenants' infant heirs.2 A
Wardship was profitable since the king could sell it for revenue.
In 1401, 3 a buyer named Prophete was dissatisfied. He therefore
petitioned the king's chancellor, the Bishop of Exeter, for relief.
Prophete, it seems, had been granted the wardship of an infant
whose father had held a manor of the king by knight service.
One Smart, the petition continued, had entered the manor and
had taken its profits for a year or more. Prophete prayed that
the chancellor would not allow
the said Roger Smart to go away until he had made
accord to the King and to the said suppliant ... and
that he [the chancellor] may find sufficient surety that
henceforth he will not attempt anything against the
King, nor the said John Prophete, touching the said
manor.4
No note was taken of the ward's welfare, only of the lost profits.
The chancellor was appealed to in order to protect a mercenary
guardian and an enterprising king's interest.
2. "Our Lord the King shall have the Ward of all the Lands of such as
hold of him in chief by Knights service, whereof the Tenants were seised in
their demean as of Fee at the day of their death (of whomsoever they hold
else by like service, so that they held of ancient time and land of the Crown)
until the Heir come to his lawful age.. . ." Prerogativa Regis, 17 Edw. 2, c. 1
(1324), translation taken from 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 376-77 (Pickering ed.
1762). Holdsworth refers to this statute as the "so-called statute." 1 W.
HOLDSWORTM, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473 (7th ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as HOLnsWoRTH: citations to 4, 5 and 6 HOLnsWoRTHr are taken from the
1924 editions]. Holdsworth says that "it is one of a group of anomalous docu-
ments inserted in legal MSS. between the ending of the "Vetera Statuta" in
the last year of Edward II.'s reign, and the beginning of the "Nova Statuta"
in the first year of Edward III.'s reign . . .; throughout the Middle Ages it
was accepted as a genuine statute; it may have been merely private work, or
have emanated from some official on the instructions of the king; its date is
between 1255 and 1290." Id. at 473 n.8. See F. Maitland, The 'Praerogativa
Regis,' 6 ENG. HIST. REv. 367 (1891).
3. Prophete v. Smart, W. BArLDoN, SELEcr CASES IN CHANCERY (1364-
1471) 51 (No.47) (Ch. 1401) (Selden Society 1896) [hereinafter cited as
SELECT CASES; care should be taken, however, since the Selden Society has
published other collections of "select cases"]. I have taken the liberty of
naming the cases in this paragraph.
4. Id. at 51-52.
[Vol. 22
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In Mashan v. Sabar, 5 a petition was addressed between 1413
and 1417 to the chancellor, the Bishop of Winchester, by John
de Masham. He held land to the use and profit of the lord of
Beaumont, who had held of the king. Beaumont had died and
left an infant son. Thomas Sabarn and eleven others, in the
meantime, had entered the land and turned it "into common."6
De Masham appealed not as a dissatisfied buyer, as had Prophete.
He used a different tactic. He appealed to the chancellor as the
king's delegate, in whom the king's guardianship of his wards
rested. De Masham prayed that the infant would not be dis-
inherited. For the first time, the chancellor was being asked to
care for an infant.
In White v. -White,7 between 1399 and 1413, a widow peti-
tioned the king's chancellor, Thomas de Arundel, Archbishop of
Canterbury. She asserted that her late husband willed her the
profits of certain lands and the guardianship of their daughter
during the daughter's nonage. One Thomas White, the petition
asserted, had taken both the profits of the lands and the daugh-
ter. The widow prayed for their restoration. It is probable
that the widow could have maintained trespass against Thomas
White. She chose instead to go into chancery and base her
relief upon the will.9 Hence, through the chancellor's adjudica-
tion upon a will, he was asked to exercise jurisdiction over the
infant. Since the petition did not concern land held of the king,
the infant daughter was not a ward beonging to the king. The
chancellor's exercising jurisdiction over the infant in White
represented an acquisition of jurisdiction by him. He was acting
not as guardian to the king's wards but as caretaker to infants
generally. This represents one way the chancellor began enlarg-
5. Snrcr CASES 112 (No. 115) (Ch. 1413-1417).
6. Id. at 113.
7. SELEcT CAsEs 95 (No. 100) (Ch. 1399-1413).
8. Coke recognized the existence of a guardian per cause de nurture.
E. CoKE, COMMENTARY UPoN LiTTLETON 88b (17th ed. Hargrave and Butler
1817) [hereinafter cited as CO. LITT.; first published 1628]. "As the guardian-
ship by nurture, it only occurs where the infant is without any other guardian;
and none can have it, except the father or mother. . . . It extends no further
than the custody and government of the infant's person, and determines at
fourteen in the case both of males and females." Id. at 88b n.14 (by Hargrave).
If the father were dead, the mother would become the guardian for nurture. She
could then bring trespass against a stranger who took the infant away. See
W. MACPHERSON, LAW RELATING TO INFANTS *60 (1843).
9. The chancellor's jurisdiction in the estates area is just beginning at the
time of this case. 5 HOLDSWORTHE 288-89, 316-20. This case was evidently
brought before the chancellor because Thomas White claimed possession by
deed from the widow's late husband. The will relied upon by the widow was
probably written after the deed was given. The chancellor thus was faced
with a problem of revocation by subsequent instrument.
1970]
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ing his jurisdiction over infants, i.e., began exercising his care
for infants. 10
B. Late 16th Century
The next period for which there are petitions and reports of
interest is the second half of the sixteenth century.1' These
petitions and reports indicate two enlargements of the chancel-
lor's jurisdiction over infants, both related to other areas of his
cognizance.
One area, of which we have already seen examples,12 is that
of estates. It was early settled that the guardian of a tenant in
socage's infant heir was the next of kin to whom the tenant's
estate could not descend.13 Thus, when a tenant in socage died
intestate, and there arose a quarrel as to whom the estate could
or might descend, the situation was ripe for a relative to petition
the chancellor to settle the question and to ask to be appointed
guardian. When Nicholas Robynson died intestate, leaving
Robert Robynson an infant heir, Peter Higson, the infant's
10. See 5 HoLD5swoRTH 303. White is an instance of what MacPherson calls
"testamentary guardianship at common law." W. MACPHERSON, supra note 8,
at *68. "There is reason.., to think, that where there was no other guardian
marked out by the law, testamentary dispositions of the guardianship of chil-
dren were not unknown, even before the statute of Charles II." W. MAC-
PHERSON, supra note 8, at *68. MacPherson's reference is to An Act for Taking
Away the Courts of Wards and Liveries, 12 Car. 2, c. 24, § 8 (1660), whereby
fathers were given the right, by deed or will, to appoint guardians for their
children after their decease. Hargrave, on the other hand, considers the statute
as creating a new kind of guardianship. Co. Lirr. 88b n.15. MacPherson's and
Hargrave's opinions are reconcilable. MacPherson's father could not appoint a
guardian by deed or will where there was a guardian in chivalry. After the
statute, guardianship in chivalry was abolished. 12 Car. 2, c. 24, §§ 1, 2, 4. A
father could then appoint a guardian by deed or will whenever he desired to.
11. The petitions in this paragraph come from CALENDARS OF THE PRO-
CEEDINGS IN CHANCERY (1827-1832) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS IN
CHANCERY]. PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY is a collection of petitions from the
reign of Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603). MacPherson has evidently gone through
the hundreds of unindexed pages of the three volumes of PROCEEDINGS IN
CHANCERY. His welcome citations are being used herein. W. MACPHERSON,
supra note 8, at *102 n.h. Prefixed to PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY are "ex-
amples" of petitions of earlier proceedings. One such petition is that of
Thomas, Duke of Gloucester, who asserted that he was ousted from possession
of certain lands, the custody of which he had been given by the king as a
guardian in chivalry. 1 PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY i (Ch. 1392). In another,
two gentlemen who detained infant wards of the king, were committed to the
Fleet. Sotehill v. Harrington, 1 PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY l xxvi (Ch. 1469).
From 1469 until Burgh v. Wentworth, Cary 54, 21 Eng. Rep. 29 (Ch. 1576),
I have found nothing of note. DYER's REPORTS, which covers the period and
contains some chancery cases, is not helpful.
12. See note 9 supra.
13. See H. BaAcToN, DE LEGIBUS ET CoxsuETuDiNiBus ANGLLAE f.87b
(Twiss ed. 1879) [first published 1259?]; 2 LiTTLEToN'S TENURES C.
, § 123 [first published 1481?], quoted in Co. LITr. 87b; W. MACPHERSON,
supra note 8, at *19.
[Vol. 22.
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uncle by his mother's side (hence not capable of taking by des-
cent), petitioned the chancellor to be appointed guardian.1 4 In
Sweetman v. Edge,15 the chancellor did not grant the petition
of a grandfather by the mother's side against the grandfather by
the father's side "to have the education and bringing up of one
Richard Edge, an infant, who is seised of an estate tail of lands,
the remainder to the defendant."'" The chancellor thought the
infant adequately protected since "it appeared there were divers
remainders between the defendants [sic] and the infant's
estates.""7
The second area of the chancellor's cognizance, which was
helpful in enlarging his jurisdiction over infants, was in the
taking of accounts.' 8 Proceedings In Chancery contains three
abbreviated petitions for accountings. In Talford v. Mott,19 an
infant brought a petition for an accounting of the rents and
profits from lands of which the defendant guardian in socage
was in possession during the infant's minority. Another peti-
tion, Sharp v. Tull,20 is to the same effect. Sewell v. Barratt2 '
is a petition for an accounting from a customary guardian. In
Cary's Reports, Burgh v. Wentworth2 2 is noteworthy for the
relief prayed for, namely an accounting of the "profits by him
[the guardian] taken of the lands of the plaintiff during his
minority, for fines of leases, woodsales, and wilful decay of
houses."2 3 Having exercised his concern for infants by deciding
guardianship disputes, the chancellor, through these petitions,
began protecting the same infants from their guardians.
C. Early 17th Century
The beginning of the seventeenth century saw a greater con-
cern by the chancellor for the care of infants.24 In three cases,
which evidently the chancellor had because estate issues he ad-
judicated were presented, we have the following brief orders:
14. Higson v. Worlyche, 1 PROcCEINGS IN CHANCERY 405 (Ch. 1558-1603?).
15. Cary 96, 21 Eng. Rep. 51 (Ch. 1577-1578).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. "[B]y the end of the fifteenth century, the mere fact that the case in-
volved the taking of accounts was sufficient ground for the interposition of the
chancellor." 5 HOLDSWORTH 288.
19. 3 PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY 293 (Ch. 1590).
20. 3 PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY 96 (CL 1586).
21. 3 PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY 89 (Ch. 1594).
22. Cary 54, 21 Eng. Rep. 29 (Ch. 1576).
23. Id.
24. The cases from TorHILrE are due to Holdsworth. 5 HOLISWoRTn 315 n.8.
19701
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[C]hildren allowed seven or eight pounds per centum
for their education, where there is no allowance by the
will ;21
executors ordered to put in good security to allow five
pounds per centum for education, and to make good
their portions;28
the defendant's wife being priviment ensient at her
husband's death, the child could not be provided for by
law, but the Court ordered that the child should have
sufficient allowance.
27
From these orders it cannot be said that the chancellor had the
care of all infants, but it can be surely said that once an infant
was before him upon a proper bill he exercised what care he
could.
28
25. Bright v. Chappell, Tothill 6, 21 Eng. Rep. 106 (Ch. 1629-1630).
26. Barwick v. Barwick, Tothill 52, 21 Eng. Rep. 121 (Ch. 1601-1602).
27. Pope v. Moore, Tothill 93, 21 Eng. Rep. 133 (C. 1627-1628 or 1605-
1606).
28. A short discourse on the Court of Wards and Liveries is necessary. It
is inserted in a footnote because its relevance to the development of chancery's
jurisdiction over infants was not positive. Holdsworth believes, and probably
rightly, that its existence fettered that development. See 5 HoLDsWORTH 309-
10, 315.
The Court of Wards and Liveries was established by two statutes, 32 H. 8 c.
46 (1540) and 33 H. 8 c. 22 (1541). To this court were transferred "all
wards which the kings highnesse now is, or hereafter shall be intituled to have,
with their mannors, lands, tenements, rents, remainders, reversions, services,
and all other hereditaments whatsoever they be... all and every of the kings
widows that now be, or hereafter shall be, and that have married themselves
without the kings license . . . for their reasonable fines to be made to the
kings use ... all and singular ideots and naturall fools now being in the kings
hands, or that hereafter shall come and be in the kings hands . . . ." E. CoKE,
THE FOURTH PART OF TEE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND **187-89
(1797) [hereinafter cited as FOURTH INSTITUTE; first published 1641].
The reason for the establishment of the court was to make more efficient the
collection of the king's feudal revenues. H. BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
HISTORY AND RECORDS OF THE COURT OF WARDS AND Ll uEs 13 (1953).
The effect which this court had upon chancery should be plain. It took
many cases from chancery's cognizance, cases through which chancery's juris-
diction over infants could have grown. Evidently chancery respected the
Court of Ward's exclusive jurisdiction over wards of the king. See C. MoNao,
AcrA CANCELLARrAE 392 (No. LXXIX) (1847). And evidently the Court
of Wards "jealously guarded its jurisdiction." H. BELL, supra, at 110. More-
over, having taken many cases from chancery, the Court of Wards, as its
purpose would indicate, did not expand its jurisdiction to care for its infant
wards. In fact, "for the most part it acted in accordance with precedent and,
except where there had been modification by statute, its judgments were based
on the common law of medieval times." H. BELL, supra, at 109.
The lack of concern by the Court of Wards for the welfare of its charges
and its attentiveness to the collection of revenues led to agitation against it,
FOURTH INSTITUTE **202-03, H. BELL, supra, c. 7, and its eventual dissolution,
An Act for Taking Away the Court of Wards and Liveries, 12 Car. 2, c. 24
§ 1 (1660). Besides the dissolution of the court; the agitation against it
[Vol. 22
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D. Late 17th. Century
In Lord Nottingham's time,29 chancery's jurisdiction over
infants expanded somewhat. There are several bills for an
accounting, and we notice that the chancellor is taking care lest
the guardian take advantage of his position. In HaZl v. Yates,80
an accounting is taken and a reasonable allowance is made "for
the Education and Maintenance of the said nfants, and for all
Money disbursed by him [the guardian] upon their Account."3 1
But in Portington v. Althrop,382 "no allowance ought to be made
to a guardian for his pains in managing, for guardian by deed
or will may refuse the employment if he like it not.
'3 3
There are also two instances of broad orders for the education
of infants. In Corcellis v. Corcellis No. 1,34 a widow brought a
bill in chancery to be relieved of an action at law. It seems that
a testamentary guardian had brought an action at law to obtain
custody of the widow's infants, who were willed to his guardian-
ship by the widow's late husband. Lord Nottingham allowed a
plea that the defendant was a testamentary guardian. He also
allowed the widow to reply and disprove the will, if she could.
Apparently she failed to disprove the will, because in Corseflis
v. Corsellis[sic] No. 23r she brought another bill, this time
asserting new matters as to the testator's intentions. According
to Yale, one resolution of Comsellis No. 2 was as follows:
Where the guardianship of the plaintiff is devised to
the defendant who is also to have the lands if the plain-
produced an evident awareness of the crown's responsibility for the welfare of
infants.
Cases decided by the Court of Wards may be found in LEY'S REPORTS (1659)
[including A LEARNED TREATISE CONCERNING WARDS AND LvEams appended
to the end thereof]; DymR's REPORTS (1585); PLOWDEN'S COMMENTAM1ES
(1578).
29. Sir Heneage Finch, afterwards Lord Nottingham, was Lord Chancellor
1673-1682. Reports of cases decided by him are collected in REPORTS Tempore
FINCH (R.t. Finch) and in 1-2 D. YALE, LoRD NOTTINGHAeS CHANCERY CASES
(Selden Society 1957, 1961) [hereafter cited as D.YALa]. The later also con-
tains a thorough introduction to Lord Nottingham's life and work. A shorter
piece can be found in 6 HOLDSwoRTH 539-48.
30. R.t.Finch 2, 23 Eng. Rep. 1 (Cl. 1673).
31. Id. at 2, 23 Eng. Rep. at 2.
32. 2 D.YALE 476-77 (Ch. 1676-1677).
33. Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added). See also Worsop v. Edy, 1 D. YALE
205-06 (Ch. 1675) ; Edwards v. Jorden, P.Finch 317, 23 Eng. Rep. 173 (Ch.
1677). For text and cases on other aspects of the chancellor's control over
guardians' finances, see 6 HOLDSWORTH 649 nn.8-12, 650 nn.1-2.
34. R.t.Finch 200, 23 Eng. Rep. 110 (Ch. 1674-1675). I have taken the
liberty of labelling this case "No. 1" and the case noted in the text accompany-
ing note 35 infra "No. 2."- The "No. 2" case substitutes an "s" for the 'c"
in the names of the parties. Perhaps this substitution has prevented their
recognition as related cases.
35. 2 D. YALE 498, R.t.Finch 351, 23 Eng. Rep. 192 (Ch. 1677).
1970]
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tiff die without issue, there the Court will appoint the
place and manner of the infant's education. 8
According to Reports Tempore Finch, one of the court's orders
was as follows:
That the Defendant shall not have the Custody of the
Infant, but that he shall remain at Eaton till this Court
give farther Direction, &c.
3 T
The second instance of a broad order is found in the case of
Shaftsbury v. Hannam.88 The Earl of Shaftsbury claimed the
guardianship of infant Hannam by deed from the infant's late
father. The widow alleged,
that the sole Guardianship of the Child belonged to her
by the last Will of her Husband; and that the Custody
always remained with her, till the Earl of Shaftsbury,
when he was Lord Chancellor, sent a Serjeant at Arms
to seise the Infant; but that she hearing her Son was
brought up in the House of a Nonconformist, where he
was both hardly used and ill cloathed, she went to see
him, and finding him in an ill Condition and consump-
tive, she brought him away without any Force.3 9
The court held that the deed was probably revoked by the will
and that it would continue the guardianship of the infant in
his mother "until she should be evicted thereof by due Course
of Law."40 However, it went on to make the following addi-
tional order:
But because it was insinuated by the Counsel for the
Plaintiffs, that the Lady Hannam was a Papist (which
she utterly denied), therefore unless she would dispose
her self to receive the Sacrament according to the Rites
of the Church of England, before the End of the next
Term, and produce a legal Certificate thereof, the Court
would then consider to remove the Infant into such
Hands as might secure his Education in the Protestant
ReZigion.41
Obviously, after this case, it can be said that if the infant is
properly before the court (i.e., if there is an estate issue which
36. Id. at 498, 23 Eng. Rep. at 192.
37. R.t.Finch at 353, 23 Eng. Rep. at 194.
38. R.t.Finch 323, 23 Eng. Rep. 177 (Ch. 1677).
39. Id.
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the chancellor has authority to adjudicate, an accounting, a relief
from an action at law, etc.), the court will concern itself with the
infant's care and its orders for his care may be quite broad.
42 ' 48
II. THE KMNG AS "PAIMNS PATRIAE"
Traditionally, the king had certain prerogatives. 4 These first
appear as rights to revenue in the so-called statute Prerogativa,
Regis,45 and later appear as "powers which are vested in the
crown by the laws of England... necessary for the support of
society." 46 "Parens patriae" had traditionally been viewed as
42. Notice should be taken of Lord Nottingham's statement that "the Court
would then consider to remove the Infant into such Hands as might secure
his Education. . . ." This dictum is a broader statement of the court's right to
appoint guardians than we have seen before. Previously the court had always
decided the right of guardianship between competing parties. It had never
given guardianship to a stranger.
43. In contradistinction to the chancellor's growing care for infants was his
loss of jurisdiction over the king's wards. It has already been noted that from
1540-1660, jurisdiction over the king's wards was in the Court of Wards and
Liveries. See note 28 supra. Upon the dissolution of that court, instead of
returning to chancery, the wardships were discharged. The relevant part of
the Act is as follows:
And that all tenures by knights service of the King . . . and by
knights service in capite, and by socage in capite of the King, and the
fruits and consequents thereof, happened or which shall or may
hereafter happen or arise thereupon or thereby, be taken away and
discharged, and law, statute, custom or usage to the contrary hereof
in anywise notwithstanding. An Act for Taking Away the Court of
Wards and Liveries, 12 Car. 2, c. 24, § 1 (1660).
The result was that while the chancellor was caretaker to some infants, he was
no longer guardian to others. This should have had some importance. The
difference between the roles of caretaker and guardian had had significance.
For example, the king was guardian to idiots. As such, he could take the
profits of their lands. Prerogativa Regis, 17 Edw. 2, c. 9 (1324). See note 2
supra. He was caretaker to lunatics. The profits of their lands had to be
applied to their maintenance and use. Id. at c. 10. With respect to the king's
wards, he had had the rents and profits of their lands, their marriages, and
the control of their bodies. The latter entailed the right "to bring him [the
ward] up in such a way that he would become a worthy tenant." H. BELL,
stipra note 28, at 1. As a caretaker, the chancellor had so far worked on an
ad hoc basis. If there were an accounting against a socage or testamentary
guardian, the chancellor had ascertained that the guardian was not cheating
the infant. See Portington v. Althrop, supra note 32 and accompanying text. If
there were a dispute as to who should be guardian in socage, the chancellor
oversaw that no one with too much financial interest became the guardian. Cf.
Sweetman v. Edge, supra note 15 and accompanying text. More recently the
chancellor had made at least two orders respecting infants' education. See
Corsellis v. Corsellis No. 2, supra notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text;
Shaftsbury v. Hannam, supra note 41 and accompanying text. We shall see,
however, that though the distinction was sometimes made verbally, it had no
significant effect upon the chancellor in his role as caretaker. Partly, this may
have been due to the use of the concept "parens patriae."
44. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *237
(Lewis ed. 1897); J. CHiTTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PamOATVES
OF THE CROWN (1820) ; 4 HOLDSWORTH 203-08.
45. 17 Edw. 2, cc. 1-16 (1324). See notes 2 and 43 supra and note 50 infra.
46. 1 W. BLAcsTowE *237.
1970]
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one of these prerogatives. 47 It may be, however, that "parens
patriae" was first viewed as duty owned by the crown to its
subjects. It may have been devised as a restriction upon the
king's prerogatives.48 Indeed, Chitty, in 1820, defines "parens
patriae" almost apologetically. He says,
The King is in legal contemplation the guardian of his
people; and in that amiable capacity is entitled, (or
rather it is his Majesty's duty, in return for the alle-
giance paid him,) to take care of such of his subjects,
as are legally unable, on account of mental incapacity,
whether it proceed from 1st. nonage: 2. idiocy: or 3.
lunacy: to take proper care of themselves and their
property.
4 9
To debate whether "parens patriae" was first a power or a duty
is to quibble. A more interesting question is the effect of "parens
patriae" on the development of the chancellor's jurisdiction.
In this section will be traced "parens patriae" before it appeared
in infant cases.
Chitty's definition is a good starting point. It is too narrow,
however, because "parens patriae" was not limited to those
"legally unable" but included some otherwise "unable", because
it was not limited to "mental incapacity" but included other
incapacities, and because it was not limited to the three groups
mentioned but also such other seemingly diverse elements as
charities, playing-cards, parks, chases, and warrens.
A. Idiots and Lunatics.
The king's prerogatives with respect to the lands of idiots
and lunatics were recognized in Prerogativa Regis.50 An attempt
47. See J. CHITTY, supra note 44, at 155; J. STORY, COMsrENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1333 (3rd Eng. ed. 1920) [first published 1836];
4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1304 (5th ed. 1941)
[first published 1881-1883].
48. See F. BAUMER, THE EARLY TUDOR THEORY OF KINGSHIP c. 6 (1966).
49. J. CHIrTY, supra note 44, at 155.
50. The King shall have the Custody of the Lands of natural Fools
taking the Profits of them without Waste or Destruction, and shall
find them their Necessaries, of whose Fee soever the Lands be
holden. And after the death of such Idiots he shall render it to the
right Heirs, so that such Idiots shall not aliene, nor their
Heirs shall be disinherited. 17 Edw. 2, c. 9 (1324), translated
in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 380 (Pickering ed. 1762).
Also the King shall provide, when any (that beforetime hath
had his Wit and Memory) happen to fail of his Wit, as there are
many per lucida intervalla, that their Lands and Tenements shall
be safely kept without Waste and Destruction, and that they and
their Household shall live and be maintained competently with
[Vol. 2
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apparently was made, however, even in Prerogativa Regis, to
limit the king's rights to the lands. The king had guardianship
of natural fools, those mentally incapacitated from birth. But
with respect to lunatics, those who lost their "wit" later, the king
had only the unprofitable care of them. The distinction, I sur-
mise, was made in order to prevent abuse of the prerogative,
i.e., in order to prevent enemies of the king from being declared
lunatic and having the profits of their lands added to the king's
treasury.
Fleta,51 speaking to idiots, justifies their guardianship as
being due to "their inability to rule themselves." 52 Fleta's Latin
is "se ipsos regere non nouerunt."53 In speaking to why infants
should be under the wardship and care of others, Fleta's reason
is "se ipsos regere non norunt."M5 Fleta's description of the
idiot's incapacity continues as follows: "[they] being adjudged
ever to be, as it were, below full age." 55 Bracton, too, speaks of
infants being under the wardship and care of others because
the Profits of the same, and the Residue besides their Sustenation
shall be kept to their Use, to be delivered unto them when they
come to right Mind; so that such Lands and Tenements shall in
no wise be aliened; and the King shall take nothing to his own
Use. And if the Party die in such Estate, then the Residue shall
be distributed for his Soul by the Advice of the Ordinary.
17 Edw. 2, c. 10 (1324).
See notes 2 and 43 supra.
51. "The name given to an ancient treatise on the laws of England, founded
mainly upon the writings of Bracton and Glanville, and supposed to have been
written in the time of Edw. I. The author is unknown, but it is surmised that
he was a judge or learned lawyer who was at that time confined in the Fleet
prison, whence the name of the book." BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY 768-69 (4th
ed. 1957). Edward I reigned 1272-1307. Hence the book was written before
the given date of Prerogativa Regis. However, the statute's date is said to
have been earlier. See note 2 supra.
52. It is the custom to appoint guardians for the lands and persons
of idiots and fools for the whole of their lives, and this has been
lawful and permissible because of their inability to rule themselves,
being adjudged ever to be, as it were, below full age. But because
they were suffering many disinhersions by reasons of such
wardships, it was provided and generally agreed that the king
should have the perpetual wardship of the persons and inheritance
of such idiots and fools from whatsoever lord they held their lands,
provided that they were idiots and fools from birth--though not if
they became so later-and that the king should marry them and
preserve them from any disinhersion, with this proviso, however,
that the lords of the fees and others interested should lose none of
their rights, for example, to services, rents, wardships up to the
age of lawful majority, according to the nature of the fees, to
reliefs and such like. 1 FLETA c. 11, para. 8 (2 Selden Society
ed. 21 H. Richardson and G. Sayles 1955).
53. 1 FLETA, C. 11, para. 8
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"so ipsos regere n5 wotrt."51 Thus, as early as the thirteenth
century, we see two things of interest: an early view of the
klng's relation to idiots as one of beneficence; a parallelism be-
tween idiots as wards and infants as wards.
Two and one-half centuries later, Fitzherbert's rationale is
that the guardianship of idiots is an obligation owed to loyal
subjects. The relevant passage, in translation, appears as follows:
[T]he King by the Law of right is for to defend his
Subjects, their Goods and Chattels, Lands and Tene-
ments; and therefore in the Law every loyal Subject
is taken into the Kings Protection; . . . And because
that every man is within the Kings Protection, an Ideot,
who cannot defend nor govern himself, nor order his
Lands, Tenements, Goods, nor Chattels, the King of
right ought for to have him in his custody, and to rule
him, and his Lands and Tenements, Goods and Chattels;
and that appeareth by the Statute of Praerogativa
Regia, cap. 8.1
7
Fourteen years after Fitzherbert had written the above, Staun-
ford wrote as follows:
So it appearethe by Bracton, that in his tyme yt was
thoughte expedient, that folke that were destraught
should haue a tutour, or one that should take the charge
of them, whiche office since is reuolued onto the kinge,
and made parcell of his prerogatiue. For as Fitzherbert
in his Natura breuim folio 232 very well saithe. The
kinge is the protectour of all his subiectes, and of al
theire goodes, landes, and tenements, and therefore of
suche as cannot gouerne them selues, nor order their
lands & tenements, his grace (as a father) muste take
uppon him to prouide for them, that they them selues
and their things maye be preserued.58
By Staunford's time, the guardianship had become something
the king "muste take uppon him to prouide for them, that they
them selues and their things maye be preserued." 59 Staunford's
rationale looks very much like Prerogativa Regis' rationale
56. H. BRACTON, supra note 13 at n.86a.
57. A. FiTzHmRmT, DE NATuRA BREvium 232 (1666) [first published
1534?].
58. W. STAuNFoRD, AN ExposmoN OF THE KINGS PRERoGATiuR 37a (1573)
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for the care of lunatics, namely "that they and their House-
hold shall live and be maintained competently . . . so that
such Lands and Tenements shall in no wise be aliened." 60
Staunford's merging of the two classes, idiots and lunatics,
apparently reflects the practice of his day.61 Bell tells us that
"custody crept into grants of lunatics."6 2 And the custody of
both idiots and lunatics "were sued for and obtained in much
the same fashion as the wardship of heirs.163 Though custody
of lunatics was given, it seems that both idiots and lunatics
were treated as objects for care rather than as sources for
revenue. Bell tells us that the conditions upon which custody
of an idiot could be gotten began to parallel those of a lunatic
"in one important way ... namely that he [the guardian] should
account for any surplus of the rents and profits.164 "More im-
portant perhaps, it is pretty clear that no great effort was made
by the crown to turn it [wardship] to profit; nor was the com-
mittee [to whom the guardianship was given] allowed to do
SO."265
While merging the two classes (idiots and lunatics) and
placing their guardianship upon a duty of care, Staunford also
describes the king as acting "as a father."6 6 This is the first time
that the author knows that the king's relation to his wards is
called a "father" relation. Since Staunford used the YearBooks
a good deal for his work,67 it may be that the expression "as a
father" can be found there. But it is significant that the expres-
sion was used with reference to the king's wards when the king's
duty to them was said to be one of care.
Coke, whose Second Institute" was first published in 1641,69
while explaining the statute Magna Charta,70 discusses whether
the king's prerogative as to the lands of idiots existed at the time
of that statute. In this discussion, the following passage appears:
60. See note 50 supra.
61. See H. BELL, supra note 28, at 129-30.
62. Id. at 129.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 130.
65. Id.
66. See note 58 supra.
67. See Staunford's preface to W. STAUNFORD, supra note 58. It is also
interesting that the earliest general use of the "father" concept with respect to
the king that I have found is in ERASMUS, INSTITUTIO PRINCIPIS CHRISTIANI
(1516) ("paterfamilias"), taken from F. BAuMER, supra note 48, at 196.
68. E. COKE, SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1809 ed.) [Hereinafter cited as SECOND INSTiTUTE].
69. See 5 HOLDSWORTH 466.
70. 9 H. 3, before c. 1 (1225).
1970]
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And idiots from their nativity were accounted alwayes
within age, and therefore the custodie of them was
perpetuall. And the lord of whom the land was holden,
had not a tenant that was able to doe him service. And
therefore within the reason of a custodie of a minor
or of an heire within age in case of wardship.7 1
The passage indicates that the parallelism between infants and
idiots had continued into Coke's day. This parallelism may
account somewhat for the mistake found72 in Coke's Reports, in
the report of Beverley's Case.73 Beverley's Case concerned a
defense of non compos mentis to an obligation upon a bond.
During the course of the report, Prerogativa Regis is discussed.
Part of that discussion, as it appeared in the 1826 edition, is as
follows:
And that the King shall have the protection of the
goods and chattels of an idiot, as well as of his lands,
appears by F.N.B. [Fitzherbert's JNatura Brevium]
232b. where he says, that if an idiot who cannot defend
or govern himself, nor order his lands, tenements, goods,
and chattels, the King of right ought to have him in his
custody, and to protect him and his lands, goods, and
chattels.7
4
However, when first published the passage erroneously ap-
peared as follows:
Et q le Roy auer ptection del biens & chateux dun
enfant cibid c6e de son terr, appiert p Fitz.Na.Br.232b.
ou il dit q un Ideot q ne poyt soy defdder ou goilner, ne
order sez tres tenemts bids ne chateux, le roy de droit
couiet luy auer en son custody, & a ptecter luy et ses
tres biens & chateux.
75
Similar errors can be found in the French editions of 1618 and
1697. The English translations contain two errors. In the 1658
and 1680 English editions, "infant" is twice substituted for
"idiot" in the above passage.
78
71. SECOND INSTITUTE *14.
72. The mistakes in the 1610 and 1658 editions of 4 CoxE's RPoRrs were
found by Lawrence B. Custer of Marietta, Georgia (LL.B., U.Pa. 1960), and
were noted in Professor Foote's materials for the Family Law course at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School 3A-5 (unpublished). See FOOra,
LEVY, AND SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 394 n.13 (1966).
73. 4 Coke's Rep. 123b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (L.B. 1603).
74. 4 Coke's Rep. at 126b (Thomas and Fraser ed 1826).
75. 4 Coke's Rep. at 126b (Stationers ed. 1610) [emphasis added].
76. The five editions published in the seventeenth century are in the Biddle
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Thus, we can conclude that in the seventeenth century the
king's relation to idiots and lunatics was that of guardian to
ward, that the guardianship was a duty of care rather than a
source of profit, and that the duty had at least once been
described as that of a "father."
The chancellor's jurisdiction over idiots and lunatics is ex-
plained as follows by Holdsworth:
Jurisdiction over those of unsound mind [idiots], being
regarded in early times as a valuable right, was vested
originally in the Exchequer. As it came to be regarded
in the light of a duty it passed to the Chancellor ....
This delegation might equally well have been made to
any other great officer of state; and, while the Court of
Wards (1539-1660) was in existence, the jurisdiction
was generally exercised by it. The fact that after 1660
the delegation was almost always made to the Chancel-
lor, is due, partly to his position as a great officer of
state, responsible for the issue of the commission [to
inquire into alleged insanity], partly to his position as
the leading member of the Council. It was to the Coun-
cil that a person of unsound mind so found by inquisi-
tion could originally appeal; and from the Chancellor
it was to the Council and not to the House of Lords
that lunacy appeals originally lay.7
B. Chaities
The origins of chancery's jurisdiction over charities lie in
sixteenth and early seventeenth century poor law.78 The poor
law is said to have had several aims, including to provide work
for those able-bodied and willing, and to coerce, by the ma-
chinery of the criminal law, those able-bodied and unwilling.Th
However, it is in a third aim of the poor law we are interested,
namely the support and maintenance of those not able bodied,
the so-called impotent poor.
With reference to this third class, much legislation had been
passed over the years, including public collection of alms,80
special license to beg,81 relief in hospitals,8 2 supervision of
77. 1 HOLDSWORTH 474-75.
78. See generally 4 HOIDSWoRTH 387-402; E. LEONARD, Tnx EARLY HISTORy
OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF (1965 ed.).
79. 4 HOLDSWoRTH 392.
80. 27 1-. 8, c. 25 (1535).
81. 2 & 3 Phil. and M. c. 5, § 7 (1555); 5 Eliz. c. 3, § 10 (1562); 14 Eliz.
c. 5, § 40 (1572).
82. Id. § 8.
19701
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charitable foundations by bishops and justices.83 "[T]he assump-
tion by the state of the burden of providing for the poor and
impotent . .. led it to interest itself in the administration of
public charitable trusts."84 In 1601, An Act to Redress the Mis-
employment of Lands, Goods and Stocks of Money Heretofore
Given to Certain Charitable Uses was passed. 5 As its title indi-
cates, its purpose was to remedy the misappropriation of funds
"by reason of frauds, breaches of trust, and negligence in those
that should pay, deliver, and employ the same."86 By this Act,
the chancellor was empowered to award commissions to bishops
and others of good standing authorizing them to enquire into the
application of the revenues of charitable foundations. The com-
missioners could make orders, reviewable by the chancellor.
"[T]he Act enabled the Chancellor to intervene effectively to
suppress breaches of trust."
T8
"[O]ther provisions of the Act were so interpreted that he
[the chancellor] was able to give effect to many charitable gifts
in spite of defects which would have been fatal to the validity of
any other gift."88  Thus, the chancellor saved from invalidity
charitable trusts that would otherwise have been void for in-
definiteness. For example, in Champion v. Smith,"9 one Ridley
devised lands "that the parson and churchwardens in Thames
street, London, and four honest men of that parish, should sell
the land, and employ the money for the poor and charitable uses
in that parish." °0 The chancellor held that the devise was not
void because of indefiniteness. Similarly, the chancellor held
good a bequest of "monies to a charitable use, to be bestowed for
poor people." 01
In 1670, Pa er v. Newan. 92 came before the Lord Keeper.93
A testator had devised all his lands and goods to be sold and
applied for the maintenance of the scholars of Trinity College in
Cambridge subject to the following limitation: "That if any by
83. Id. §§ 32, 37.
84. 4 HoLDSwoRTt 399.
85. 43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601).
86. Id.
87. 4 HOLDSWoRTH 399.
88. Id.
89. Tothill 30, 21 Eng. Rep. 114 (Ch. 1605-1606).
90. Id. at 31, 21 Eng. Rep. at 114.
91. Mayor of Bristol v. Whitton, Tothill 33, 21 Eng. Rep. 115 (Ch. 1633-
1634). See also Attorney General v. Syderfen, 1 Vern. 224, 23 Eng. Rep. 430
(Ch. 1683) (devise to such charity as testator had in writing appointed; no
writing having been found, the king appointed one).
92. 1 Ch. Ca. 157, 22 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1670).
93. Sir Orlando Bridgman.
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Cavillation concerning the Law of Maintenance should go about
to hinder this Bequest, or if any of his Bequest might not be
suffered to go to the College, then the Defendant [in Palmer V.
Newmen] should enjoy all his Lands, Goods, &c.1 4  It was
alleged that the defendant "raiseth Cavils to defeat the Char-
ity.195 The attorney general had brought suit in behalf of the
king. The Lord Keeper was of the opinion that the suit should
probably9" have been brought by a commission appointed by the
court. He thought the suit fell within "the Statute of 30 EZiz."97
[43 Eliz.A98]. But in speaking to suits not within the statute,
the Lord Keeper said that "the King as Pater Patriae may in-
form for any Publick Benefit for Charitable Uses." 99
Five years later, in Jones v. Peacock,'00 Lord Nottingham had
to decide whether a bequest of a charitable trust was void for
indefiniteness. In the course of the case it again was asked who
should have brought the suit. Lord Nottingham answered as
follows:
To which I said the case was never in a proper course
until now, for the King as Pater patriae may and ought
to be the great protector of all charities which were not
within the regulation of 43 Eliz., for he was so at Com-
mon Law before the statute, and the consent of execu-
tors or heirs to the diverting of the charity is not
material, for though the charity be in itself uncertain to
what poor it should belong, yet the King by his pre-
rogative may make the application to such of his poor
subjects as he please. 10'
Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century the chancellor
viewed himself as giving fatherly protection to all charities.
This role was readily accepted by the textwriters.
10 2"103
94. 1 Ch. Ca. at 157, 22 Eng. Rep. at 741.
95. Id. at 158, 22 Eng. Rep. at 741.
96. There was a consent degree despite the court's opinion.
97. 1 Ch. Ca. at 158, 22 Eng. Rep. at 741.
98. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
99. 1 Ch. Ca. at 158, 22 Eng. Rep. at 741. It is interesting to note that 1
CHANCERY CASES was first published in 1697. The first known use of "pater
patriae" in an infant case was in 1697. See note 124 infra.
100. 1 D. YALE 209, R1t.Finch 245, 23 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1675).
101. 1 D. YALE at 209. This does not appear in R.t.Finch.
102. See H. BALLow, A TREATISE OF EQuITY 456-58 (Fonblanque and
Laussat notes 1835) [first published 1737?] "The king, as parens patriae, has
the general superintendence of all charities; which he exercises by the keeper of
his conscience, the chancellor." 3 W. BLAcKSTONE *427 (1768).
103. Lord Nottingham referred to the king as "pater patriae" in a speech,
March 1664, in Parliament in support of a bill repealing the statute for
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C. Playing-cards, Parks, Chases, and 'Warrenm
"Parens patriae" was used in connection with playing-cards
and parks, chases and warrens in The Case of Monopolies
(Darcy V. Allein).104 Darcy had brought suit against Allein
for infringement of his exclusive patent to import playing-cards.
Coke himself was one of Darcy's counsel. One argument for
plaintiff appears as follows in Coke's Reports:
1. Because the said playing cards were not any merchan-
dize, or thing concerning trade of any necessary use,
but things of vanity, and the occasion of loss of time,
and decrease of the substance of many, the loss of the
service and work of servants, causes of want, which is
the mother of woe and destruction, and therefore it
belongs to the Queen (who is parens patriae, et pater-
familias totius regni,... ) to take away the great abuse,
and to take order for the moderate and convenient use
of them. 2. In matters of recreation and pleasure, the
Queen has a prerogative given her by the law to take
such order for such moderate use of them as seems good
to her. 3. The Queen, in regard to the great abuse of
them, and of the cheat put upon her subjects by reason of
them, might utterly suppress them, and by consequence
without injury done to any one, might moderate and
tolerate them at her pleasure. And the reason of the law
which gives the King these prerogatives in matters of
recreation and pleasure was, because the greatest part of
mankind are inclinable to exceed in them; and upon
these grounds divers cases were put, so. that no subject
can make a park, chace [sic], or warren within his own
land, for his recreation or pleasure, without the King's
grant or license.105
Despite the argument, Darcy lost his suit.
The proffered rationale for the prerogative as to parks, chases,
and warrens was rejected.10 6 Hence the analogy was of no help
to Darcy. Despite the rejection, Coke later repeated the ration-
ale, this time declaratively, in his Second Institute:
[T]he common law gave no way to matters of pleasure
(wherein most men do exceed) for that they brought
no profit to the common-wealth; and therefore it is not
104. 11 Coke's Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (Y-B. 1602).
105. Id. at 85b-86a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1261-62.
106. Id. at 87b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1264.
[Vol. 22
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lawfull for any man to erect a park, chase, or warren,
without a license under the great seale of the king,
who is pater patriae, and the head of the common-
wealth.107
On the other hand, the characterization of the Queen as having
the prerogative "to take away the great abuse" "in matters of
recreation and pleasure" was not disputed. Rather, it was said,
[t]he Queen was deceived in her grant; for the Queen,
as by the preamble appears, intended it to be for the
weal public, and it will be employed for the private
gain of the patentee, and for the prejudice of the weal
public.1
08
Thus, while the prerogative "to take away the great abuse" "in
matters of recreation and pleasure" was sustained, the Queen's
prerogative to grant letters patent 0 9 was set back, a prelude to
the Statute of Monopolies.
11 ' Il
Coke's argument was that card-playing, and parks, chases, and
warrens were subverting influences and that it was the king's
duty to protect his subjects from them by controlling their dis-
semination. This is not far from the king's duty to protect those
that cannot govern themselves and those that are impotent. In
fact, all of the classes of things to which "parens patriae" eventu-
ally became attached can be grouped together as classes that need
protection lest things beyond their control overcome them, i.e.,
classes that need some kind of paternal protection and care. The
author believes that idiots and lunatics and the impotent poor
(charities) were singled out as classes deserving of special care.
No doubt "parens patriae" was used to legitimate that special
care. The attempt by Coke to legitimate the king's prerogative
to grant letters patent did not find acceptance with the court.
"Parens patriae" was never used to legitimate an interest of the
king. Rather it was used to legitimate interests of the needy.
Hence the concept was available to support an argument to give
special care to infants.
107. SECOND INSTITUTE *199. "Coke"'s argument in Darcy was in 1602.
His report of the case was first published in 1615. His statement in SECOND
INSTITUTE was first published in 1641.
108. 11 Coke's Rep. at 87a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1264.
109. See generally Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the
Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 LAW Q. Rxv. 141 (1896).
110. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623).
111. As noted in the text, Darcy was an attack upon the king's prerogative
in granting letters patent. It did not attack his role as "parens patriae." Eight
years later (1610), in a speech to Parliament, King James I referred to himself
as "parens patriae." P. HUGHES AND R. FRIES, CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN
TuDOR-STuART ENGLAND 167 (1959).
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III. Tnm Arrw~ cE or "PARES PATRIX" IN INFANT CAsES
A. Falkland v. Bertie 112
The first mention of "parens patriae" ("pater patriae" in
fact) in an infant case is in Faldkand v. Bertie. A Mr. Carie
had devised land in trust for Mrs. Willoughby for life if within
three years after the testator's death she married Lord Guilford,
and then to the eldest and other sons of Mrs. Willoughby by
Lord Guilford in tail male, but if she did not marry Lord
Guilford within three years, then to Lord Falkland for life, and
then to his first and other sons in tail male. At the time of the
testator's death, Mrs. Willoughby, Lord Guilford, and Lord
Falkland were infants. Mrs. Willoughby proposed an ante-
nuptial settlement to Lord Guilford's guardians. But agreement
was never reached. More than three years after the testator's
death, Lord Falkland brought a bill for an accounting. Mrs.
Willoughby, who had married a Mr. Bertie after three years had
passed, also brought a bill for an accounting. Mrs. Willoughby
argued that since Lord Guilford's guardians had not acceded to
her proposals as they should have, she had been unable to meet
the condition to her taking the life estate." 3 Since chancery
favored infants, it should have permitted Mrs. Willoughby to
take her estate, failure to meet the condition notwithstanding.
According to the report in 2 Vernon's Reports, Lord Somers
answered the argument as follows:
And as to the Plea of Infancy, it is true Infants are
always favoured. In this Court there were several
Things that belonged to the Zing as Pater patriae, and
fell under the Care and Direction of this Court, as
Charities, Infants, Idiots, Lunaticks, &c. afterwards
such of them as were of Profit and Advantage to the
King were removed to the Court of Wards"4 by the
Statute; but upon the Dissolution of that Court, came
back again to the Chancery, where the Interests of In-
fants is so far regarded and taken Care of, that no
Decree shall be made against an Infant, without having
112. 2 Vern. 333, 23 Eng. Rep. 814 (CL. 1696); also reported mtb norn.
Bertie (Berty) v. Fa(u)lkland, 3 Ch. Ca. 129, 22 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch. 1698),
2 Freem. 220, 22 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch. 1697), 1 Eq.Ca.Ab. 110, 21 Eng. Rep.
917 (Ch. 1696-1698), 12 Mod. 182, 88 Eng. Rep. 1248 (Ch. 1697), 1 Salk. 231,
91 Eng. Rep. 205 (Ch. 1696-1698); rev'd Colles 10, 1 Eng. Rep. 155 (H.L.
1697-1698.
113. There is also some hint that Lord Guilford's guardians made unrea-
sonable counter-proposals.
114. See note 28 supra.
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a Day given him to show Cause after he comes of Age.
An Infant may by his Prochein Amy 15 call his Guard-
ian to an Account, even during his Minority; If a
Stranger enters and receives the Profits of an Infant's
Estate, he shall in the Consideration of this Court, he
looked upon as a Trustee for the Infant, and the like.
But the Court never pretended to change the Nature of
Infants Estate, or to make that absolute, which was
defeasible. Where an Estate is given to an Infant upon
a Condition, such Act as an Infant can perform, must
be done by him; and Infancy in such Case is no Excuse;
and so it was held in that Case of Fry and Porter,
which has been cited.116
There may be some doubt as to the authenticity of Lord
Somers' reference to "pater patriae." The doubt originates in
the fact that only 2 Vernon's report of the case has Lord Somers
using "pater patriae." The other reports do not. In particular,
Chancery Cases gives Lord Somers' answer to Mrs. Willougby's
argument in some detail but omits "pater patriae."11 7 Chancery
115. "And the King by his Letters Patents may make a general Gardian for
an Infant to answer for him in all Actions or Suits brought or to be brought
in all manner of Courts ... And the Infant shall have a Writ in the Chancery
for to remove his Gardian directed unto the Justices, and for to receive another,
&c. and the Court at their discretion may remove the Guardian, and appoint
another Gardian." A. FITZHEIaERT, supra note 57, at 27. Blackstone misread
Fitzherbert and used him as authority for chancery's general jurisdiction over
infants, instead of Fitzherbert's limited concern with the appointment of
guardians ad litem. "Upon the abolition of the court of wards, the care, which
the crown was bound to take as guardian of its infant tenants was totally
extinguished in every feodal view; but resulted to the king in his court of
chancery, together with the general protection (n.c.-Fitzherbert, Natura
Brevium 27) of all other infants in the kingdom. When therefore a fatherless
child has no other guardian, the court of chancery hath a right to appoint one:
and, from all proceedings thereto, an appeal lies to the house of lords." 3
BLACKSTONE, **426-27. "The fourth kind of guardian, not yet enumerated, is
the guardian ad litem. But of this special guardian it may suffice for the
present purpose to observe that the power of appointing such is incident to all
courts; and that the king may, as it is said, by letters patent appoint a guardian
to prosecute or defend for an infant in suits generally, though such appoint-
ments have been long out of use." Co. Lrrt. 88b n.16.
116. 2 Vern. at 342-43, 23 Eng. Rep. at 818.
117. "Infancy can be no Excuse for the Non-performance of the
Condition, because it is plain the Condition was to be performed
when an Infant, or else it could never have been performed. In
Fry and Porter's Case, the Lady was an Infant, and is a harder
Case than this, because there was no notice of the Will at all: But
where an Infant is bound to perform a Condition, he is bound to
it as strictly as other Persons of full Age .... Then the last thing
to be considered in the Case, was, how far the Proceedings in
Chancery might influence it. It was urged, that several Orders
had been made in this Court in Opposition to the Proposals of the
Guardians of the Lord Guilford by the Lord Chancellor Jefferies;
That no Marriage should be had, unless a Compliance was first
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Cases' report of the case was first published in 1702, five or six
years after it was decided.118 Two Vernon's was first published in
1728.110 Mere proximity to the date of the case is not that
crucial, since some reporters may be more complete than others.
What is troubling, however, is that William Peere Williams, who
edited 2 Vernon's, also reported Eyre v. Shaftsbury.120 The Eyre
court referred to the king as "pater patriae" 121 four years before
2 Vernon's was published. Of course, we do not know whether
the Eyre court in fact referred to the king as "pater patriae."
Eyre was reported in 2 Peere Williams in 1740.122 We also do
not know what manuscripts of Falkland v. Bertie were extant
when Eyre was decided.1 23 Moreover, we have no substantial
made to the Lady's Offers; that the Will directs the Account to
be taken in Chancery; and that this Court bath the care and
ordering of Infants. To which it was answered, That true it was,
that several things were trusted with this Court; It hath Jurisdic-
tion of Infants, Idiots, and Charitable Uses. Several Statutes have
altered matters in the Power of this Court, and so far they are
alter'd, and no farther. The Courts of Wards and Livery, with
respect to Infants and Idiots, were taken out of this Court, and
transferr'd in some measure to that; but by the Dissolution of that
Court, returns to this again: That Guardians are appointed by
Writ for Infants, and one or more Guardians jointly: That the
Law is favourable to Infants; no Decree of this Court shall be
had against them, but what they may shew Cause against when they
Come of Age. This Court will make Strangers accountable to
Infants, in case they take the Profits of their Estate; and tho' a
particular Person be appointed to take an Account, this Court can
direct it shall be taken before the Court. This Court, upon Appli-
cation made to it by Guardians, hath settled the Maintenance of
Infants; but in case of Infants, this Court would never dispense
with a Condition Precedent, or take away the Right of one Infarit
(as the Lord Falkland was) and give it to another, or can it ever
bind those Persons that were never Parties to the Suit." 3 Ch. Ca.
at 135-36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 1012-13.
118. The traditional citation to Bertie v. Falkland in CHANCERY CASES is 3
Ch. Ca. 129. See note 112 supra. 3 CHANCERY CASES was first published in
1745. However, 3 CHANCERY CASES was first published as SELECT CASES
and appendixed to 2 CHANCERY CASES in 1702. An original folio is in the
Biddle Law Library. Cf. J. WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 481-82 n.4 (4th ed.
1882) [hereinafter cited as J. WALLACE] ; 6 HOLDSWORTH 617.
119. Holdsworth mentions that the Vernon manuscript was the subject of
a dispute following Vernon's death. "Eventually it was decided that the cases
should be printed under the direction of the court, and in 1726-1728 two
volumes appeared, edited by Peere Williams and Melmoth. But it is probable
that the author did not intend his manuscript to be printed; and the editors
performed their work carelessly." 6 HOLSWORTH 618. 2 VERNON'S REPORTS
was published in 1728. An original folio is in the Biddle Law Library.
120. 2 P. Wins. 102, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722-1724); also reported sb
nomn. Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, Gilb. Eq. 172, 25 Eng. Rep. 121 (Ch. 1725);
later published in the United States, 3 F. WHITE & 0. TunoR, A SELECTION
OF LEADING CASES IN EQUITY *538 (3rd Am. ed. Hare and Wallace 1859).
121. 2 P. Wins. at 118, 24 Eng. Rep. at 164. See note 149 infra.
122. J. WALLACE, 501
123. See J. WALLACE, 626-27.
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motive for Peere Williams to insert "pater patriae" in his
editing of 2 Vernon's.124 What is important is that subsequent
cases relied upon Lord Somers' reference.
Assuming Lord Somers' reference to "pater patriae"' 25 is
authentic, we see the curious way in which the expression first
was used with respect to infants. The curiosity, of course, is the
reference to it in a case concerned with a condition precedent
rather than in a case concerned with guardianship or accounting.
Perhaps counsel's motivation was to prevent Mrs. Willoughby,
the infant, from being prejudiced by the unreasonable acts of
Lord Guilford's guardians. Since the chancellor had protected
infants from their own guardians, he should protect Mrs. Wil-
loughby the infant from another infant's guardian. It is more
likely, however, that Mrs. Willoughby's counsel was trying to
make the record as sympathetic as possible. 12  A year or two
earlier, in Reeve v. Long,127 King's Bench had held that an
infant not born, though in gestation, at the termination of the
preceding estate, lost his contingent remainder. The House of
Lords reversed. It is quite possible that counsel believed the
chancellor, already favoring infants, would follow suit. There
would, at least, be a good record for review by the House.
Counsel lost in chancery. But the House reversed .' 2  irs.
Willoughby got her life estate.
B. The Orand Opinion 129
In 1717, King George I called together "all of the judges of
England" to answer the question "whether the education and the
care" of his grandchildren were his by right38 Ten judges
124. Other than the normative power of the actual.
125. Recall that 1 CHANCERY CASES, in which the first known reference to
"pater patriae" in a charities case, was published the same year as Falkland
v. Bertie. See note 99 supra.
126. See Beven, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords. I, 17
LAw Q. REv. 357 (1901); 1 HOLDSWORTH 376.
127. 3 Lev. 408, 83 Eng. Rep. 754 (K.B., H.L. 1695), 1 Salk. 227, 91 Eng.
Rep. 202 (K.B. 1695).
128. Colles 10, 1 Eng. Rep. 155 (H.L. 1697-1698).
129. Fortes. 401, 92 Eng. Rep. 909 (1717).
130. Whether the Education, and the Care of the Persons of his
Majesty's Gradchildren, now in England, and of Prince Frederick,
eldest Son of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, when his
Majesty shall think fit to cause him to come into England, and
the ordering the Place of their Abode, and appointing their
Governors, Governesses and other Instructors, Attendants and
Servants, and the Care and Approbation of their Marriages,
wh grown up, do below of Right to his Majesty, as King of this
Realm or not? Id. at 402, 92 Eng. Rep. at 910.
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wrote opinions favoring the king. Two dissented. Of the ten
favoring the king, four referred to him as "father" in some
manner.13 1 These references may have had some impact on the
131. During the course of Baron Fortescue's opinion favoring the king, he
said the following:
Now the King as he is Parens Patriae, he is also Parens Nepotum,
Parent of his Grandchildren. Id. at 412, 92 Eng. Rep. at 914.
And as this is a Prerogative vested in the Crown, in the Reason
of the Law, and Nature of a Monarchy; so in all Ages the Crown
has practised, and been in possession of this Right." Id. at 413, 92
Eng. Rep. at 915.
But to suppose for once an unreasonable Thing, and what will never
happen, that there should be contradictory Commands (by the kingand his son to the king's grandchildren], the publick Good must bepreferr'd, and Duty to Parents must be always subject to the Safety of
the whole Community, and the King who is Parens Patriae, as well asParens Nepotis, must be obeyed, to whom there is a double Obligation,
by Nature and by Allegiance, i.e. by the Law of God and Law of
Man. Id. at 423, 92 Eng. Rep. at 919.
Baron Montague's opinion favoring the king began as follows:
I do not know that I ever was or could be of any other Opinion
than for the King in this Case; what gave me the first Impression
was the Government and Discipline among the Patriarchs, who edu-cated and governed all the Grandchildren and Great Grandchildren
under them.
In the Patent for the sole making of Cards, the King is calledParens Patriae & Custos Regni, & Pater Familias totius Regni. Id.
at 424, 92 Eng. Rep. at 919.
Justice Dormer's opinion favoring the king included the following:
[Tihe King has a legal Right to this Prerogative; the King isPater Patriae, and his Grandchildren are the Children of the Kingdom,
and of the Publick. Id. at 428, 92 Eng. Rep. at 921.
Justice Powis' opinion favoring the king included the following:
To give the Children of the King Education and to breed them
up for Kings is a necessary Prerogative, and particularly, to see them
brought up in the Protestant Religion, and to reform their Morals,and to learn the Constitution, and how to Govern. The King is thefittest and only Person to breed them up with the Love of their Kingand Country, and he is the Head of the Family, and he is most able
to do it, because he is assisted with the Pockets of his Subjects. Id.
at 431-32, 92 Eng. Rep. at 922.
In connection with the first paragraph of Baron Montague's opinion, see
R. FILmER, PATRIARcHA OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KiNGS (1680). Filmer's
theory of the divine right of kings was partly supported by analogy to thebiblical patriarchs. "As long as the first Fathers of Families lived, the nameof Patriarchs did aptly belong unto them; but after a few Descents, when thetrue Fatherhood it self was extinct, and only the Right of the Father descends
to the true Heir, then the Title of Prince or King was more Significant, toexpress the Power of him who succeeds only to the Right of that Fatherhood
which his Ancestors did Naturally enjoy; by this means it comes to pass, thatmany a Child, by succeeding a King, hath the Right of a Father over many a
Gray-headed Multitude, and hath the Title of Pater Patriae." Id. at 20."Although Filmer was taken up by the Royalist groups of England it is doubt-ful that more than a few gave serious consideration to the historical evidences
of the virtue of monarchy he set down in the Patriarcha. The real significanceof that work was in its appeal as a propaganda device, for it had a markedeffect on popular thought. The best evidence of Filmer's importance in his
own day is to be found in the fact that John Locke dedicated the first of histwo treatises on government to the end of denying Filmer's ideas." P.HUGHES AND R. FRIEs, supra note 111, at 286. John Locke published his
treatises in 1690. See also 6 HorLswoRTHr 276 et seq.
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cases noted hereafter because they combined "education and
care" of infants with the king's role as "father." They reflect,
perhaps, some contemporary thinking.
Of the two dissenters, one was Justice Eyre.132 As will be
noted below, five years after The Grand Opinion, counsel
attempted to make use of the king's "parens patriae" prerogative
against Justice Eyre. Whether the two events are related is open
for speculation.
C. The Duke of Beaufort v. Berty
83
The Duke of Beaufort appointed Mr. Berty and Mr. Grevill
testamentary guardians for his two sons, the younger of whom
was Lord Noel. After the Duke's death, the guardians sent
Lord Noel to Westminster School. Lord Noel's relatives thought
Eaton a more fitting place and petitioned the chancellor to send
the infant there.
William Peere Williams,8 4 who represented the guardians,
argued the issue of the court's jurisdiction poorly. There was
no dispute as to guardianship, nor an accounting to be made by
the guardians. Nor was there an action at law to be relieved
from. Despite this, Peere Williams argued that if the two guard-
ians had disagreed as to the ward's education, then
it was reasonable that the Great Seal, which has a Su-
perintendency over all Infants, should interpose; else
there would be a Failure in the due Education of the
Infant; but when both the Guardians had agreed that
Westminster School was the properest School for Lord
Noel, it was hoped the Court would not send him to
Eaton.18 5
Furthermore,
It was admitted, that in Case the Guardians should mis-
behave, the Court might interpose, upon a Presumption,
132. Eyre said in part:
[T]he Question is, Whether the King has a legal Right to dispose
of the Marriage and Education of his Grandchildren, exclusive of
the Father? The Inconveniences are above me to expatiate upon;
but if any Thing be amiss, the Legislature will set it right. No
authority has been produced out of any of our Law Books, no Guardi-
anship by the Prerogative has yet been proved; the Lord Chief
Justice Coke says nothing of this Prerogative, he would tell us surely
when these Prerogatives began, and where they ended. Fortes. at 426,
92 Eng. Rep. at 920.
133. 1 P. Wins. 702, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ch. 1721).
134. See text at note 119 supra.
135. 1 P. Wins. at 703-04, 24 Eng. Rep. at 579.
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that the Testator himself would not have instructed the
Guardians with this Power, had he foreseen they would
have abused it.136
Thus, it was admitted that chancery could interfere whenever
any testamentary guardian misbehaved.
Lord Macclesfield evidently felt some uneasiness about the
admissions and sought to justify his jurisdiction.
Lord Aacclesield, with some Warmth said, that the
Guardians were but Trustees, and that the Statute,
13 7
by enabling the Father to devise the Guardianship of
his Children, did no more than impower the Father by
Will to chuse a different Person from him or her that
would have been Guardian in Socage; a different Per-
son than what the Law would have appointed, ... But
that still a Guardian appointed according to the Stat-
ute, had no more Power than a Guardian in Socage;
and as the Court could interpose where there was a
Guardian in Socage, so might it also do in a Case of a
Guardian by the Statute, both being equally Trustees
... and as the Court would interpose, where the Estate
of a Man was devised in Trust, so would it a fortiori
concern it self, on the Custody of a Child's being de-
vised to a Guardian, who was but a Person intrusted in
that Case, since nothing could be of greater Concern
than the Education of Infants.
138
The notion that guardians were trustees, despite the lack of
financial interest, was an appealing notion. An alleged breach
of trust would then warrant court interference.
The chancellor widened the court's power to interfere against
guardians further.
Likewise in Answer to the Objection that the Court
should not interpose until the Guardians misbehaved;
His Lordship observed, that preventing Justice was to
be preferred to punishing Justice; and that he ought
rather to prevent the Mischief and Misbehaviour of
Guardians, than to punish it when done. That if any
136. 1 P. Wins. at 704, 24 Eng. Rep. at 579.
137. See note 10 supra.
138. Id. at 704-05, 24 Eng. Rep. at 579. Recall that a guardian in socage
was someone to whom the estate could not descend. Quaere whether the court
would interfere, except for an accounting, where the guardian had no financial
interest. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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wrong Steps had been taken which might not deserve
Punishment, yet if they were such as induced the least
Suspicion of the Infant's being like to suffer by the
Conduct of the Guardians, (as there were in this Case)
or if the Guardians chose to make Use of Methods that
might turn to the Prejudice of the Infant, the Court
would interpose, and order the Contrary; and that this
was grounded upon the general Power and Jurisdiction
which it had over all Trusts, and a Guardianship was
most plainly a Trust.3 9
The court left Lord Noel at Westminster since he had made
considerable progress there. It warned that it would remove
him and send him to Eaton should he not behave well.
D. Eyre v. The Countess of Shaftslury
40
Justice Eyre (who dissented in The Grand Opinion) was the
testamentary guardian of the infant Earl of Shaftsbury.' 41 In
1722, Justice Eyre,
139. Id. at 705, 24 Eng. Rep. at 580. See In re Baby Girl Turner, 12 Ohio
Misc. 171, 229 N.E.2d 764 (C.P. 1967) (child taken away from mother at
birth; the Chancellor's "the Infant's being like to suffer by the Conduct of the
Guardians"?) ; cf. State v. Larson, 240 Ore. 474, 402 P.2d 239 (1965) ("French
kissing" may contribute to the delinquency of a minor; the Chancellor's "Use of
Methods that might turn to the Prejudice of the Infant"?).
140. 2 P. Wins. 102, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722); also reported sub twm.
Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, Gilb. Eq. 172, 25 Eng. Rep. 121 (Ch. 1725); later
published in the United States, 3 F. WHITE & 0. TUDOR, A SELEcTION OF LEAD-
ING CASE IN EQUITY *538 (3rd Am. ed. Hare and Wallace 1859). Original
folios of PTEEa WILLIAMS AND GILBERT'S CASES IN EQUITY are in the Biddle
Law Library. With reference to GILBERTS, Wallace has said; "The volume
is one of no kind of weight, and when cited by Sergeant Wynne (22d June,
1737, in the Common Pleas), 'the court exploded the book, and told the
Sergeant they hoped he would quote cases from some better authority."'
J. WALLACE 502.
141. The infant earl was evidently the great-grandson of the first Earl of
Shaftesbury (spelled with an "e" in history books but without in the reports).
The first earl had the distinct pleasure of being Chancellor before Lord
Nottingham (1672). "He was essentially a politician, and a strenuous advocate
of the political cause with which he happened to be identified. His career
shows us that he had some of the modern demagogue's contempt for legal
technicalities when they impeded his programme, and all his reverence for them
when they could be made to serve his purpose." 6 HOLDSWORTH 526. "He
started from the conception of tolerance as Locke had done. .. He may be
regarded as the principal founder of that great party which, in opposition to the
prerogative and to uniformity, has inscribed upon its banner political freedom
and religious tolerance." 4 L. RANKE, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 166-67 (1875),
quoted in 6 HOLDSWORTH 525 n2. He was also the Shaftsbury of Shaftsbury
v. Hannam, supra note 38 and accompanying text. The infant's father was an
author of some repute. "His early education had been supervised by Locke."
D. OGG, ENGLAND IN THE REIGN OF JAMES II AND WILLIAM 111 541 (1963).
It may be recalled that Locke had opposed Filmer's prerogative. See note 130
supra. His father died in 1713, at age 42. The infant earl was born in 1710.
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perceiving that his Lordship [the infant] had not a
proper Governor provided for him by the Countess his
Mother, and that the Person who was ordered to attend
him as his Gentleman, was not a fit Person for the
Purpose, petitioned the Lord Chancellor, that he, as sole
surviving Guardian, might have the Ordering, as he
should think proper, of such Governor, Gentleman and
other Servants to attend the said Infant Earl, and that
the Person of the said Infant Earl might be delivered
over to the Petitioner.
14 2
Justice Eyre, as testamentary guardian, was entitled to cus-
tody of the infant. After Beaufort v. Berty, however, the court
might refuse custody (though, of course, in Beaufort the court
merely oversaw the infant's education) if there were the least
suspicion that the infant would suffer thereby. The Countess
accordingly answered as follows:
[T]he Crown, as Parens patriae, was the Supreme
Guardian and Superintendent over all Infants; and
since this was a Trust, it was consequently in the Dis-
cretion of the Court, whether or no they would do so
hard a Thing, as to take away an Infant under thirteen
Years of Age, from so careful a Mother as the Countess
was; that the tender Calls of Nature were on the
Mother's Side; and then there were two Physicians...
who both testified, that the Infant Earl was of a tender
and sickly Constitution.143
It is ironic that the Countess of Shaftsbury should have relied
upon the king's role as "parens patriae," a concept related his-
torically to his prerogatives, when the Shaftsburys had long
opposed the king's prerogatives. 14 4 It also is interesting that
"parens patriae" should have been used against Justice Eyre,
who five years before had denied the king the use of the pre-
rogative.1
46
Lord Macclesfield said that the will's disposition of the guard-
ianship would be binding, unless Justice Eyre misbehaved. lie
thought the Justice should not send the infant to public school
"which may be thought likely to instill into him Notions of
Slavery,"' 40 but allowed Justice Eyre to appoint the infant's
142. 2 P. Wins. at 103, 24 Eng. Rep. at 659.
143. 2 P. Wins. at 104, 24 Eng. Rep. at 659.
144. See note 139 supra.
145. See note 131 upra and accompanying text.
146. 2 P. Wins. at 108, 24 Eng. Rep. at 661.
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governor and gentleman. Justice Eyre evidently agreed that the
infant should remain in his mother's custody, and Macclesfield
so ordered.
Two years passed. Lord Macclesfield was no longer chancel-
lor.147 Justice Eyre petitioned the court again, asserting that
the infant had been married without his permission and praying
that he be granted custody. The Countess cross-petitioned, ask-
ing that Lord Macclesfield's previous order be set aside. The
infant earl cross-petitioned, asking that he be permitted to choose
his own guardian.
The court (three Lord Commissioners: Sir Joseph Jekyll, Mr.
Baron Gilbert,148 and Mr. J. Raymond) ordered Countess
Shaftsbury sequestered because of her contempt in effecting the
marriage of the infant earl without the permission of his guard-
ian and without applying to the court.
The infant's objection was ultimately stated and faced as the
following:
[T]ho' the Court might, upon a Petition, make a pro-
visional Order for the taking Care of an Infant, yet
that they ought not to make an Order determining the
Right of Guardianship, unless the Matter be brought
judicially before them, by Bill, Answer, and Proofs. 14 9
The infant asked that the Justice be required to bring a bill for
guardianship. Evidently the Justice had brought a petition
praying for enforcement of Macclesfield's order.
Jekyll responded as follows:
In this Case, here are a Bill and Answer, and both the
Will, and the Devise of the Guardianship, are set out
by the Bill, whereupon the Decree says, That the Trusts
of the Will shall be performed, one of which said Trusts
is the Guardianship of the Infant.150
Jekyll was referring to the bill that Eyre had brought two
years earlier. He was not satisfied, however, to rest solely on
that bill. He continued:
147. Lord Macclesfield had been impeached. He was evidently involved in
using the chancery's funds for speculation. The funds were lost. See 1
HOLDSWORTH 440.
148. The author of GmnRT's CASES ix EQurrY, supra note 138, HISTORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY (1758), among other works.
149. 2 P. Wms. at 117, 24 Eng. Rep. at 664.
150. 2 P. Wins. at 118, 24 Eng. Rep. at 664.
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[T]his Court may, upon Petition only, without any Bill
or Decree, make on Order to determine the Right of
Guardianship, in Regard the Care of all Infants is
lodged in the King as Pater Patriae, any by the King
this Care is delegated to his Court of Chancery.151
Having firmly established the king as "parens patriae" to
infants for the first time in an important case, Jekyll went on
to compare infants with idiots, lunatics, and charities.
In F.N.B.152 232. the King is bound, of common Right,
and by the Laws to defend his Subjects, their Goods
and Chattels, Lands and Tenements, and by the Law of
this Realm, every loyal Subject is taken to be within the
King's Protection, for which Reason it is, that Ideots
and Lunaticks, who are uncapable to take Care of
themselves, are provided for by the King as Pater
Patriae, and there is the same Reason to extend this
Care to Infants.
This is the Reason given in the Write de Ideota In-
guirendo, which the King issues out to take Care of
him, who Regimini sui ipsius, & bonoram, & terraum
suarum, minime suffi.it, which Reason also appears in
the Write de Lunatico Inguirendo, and in 4 Rep.
(BeverZey's Case) Infants, as well as Ideots, are said to
be under the Care and Protection of the Crown, as Per-
sons equally unable to take Care of themselves.
In like Manner, in the Case of Charity, the King,
pro bono publico, has an original Right to superintend
the Care thereof, so that, abstracted from the Statute
of Eliz. relating to charitable Uses, and antecedent to it,
as well as since, it has been every Day's Practice to file
Informations in Chancery in the Attorney General's
Name for the Establishment of Charities.'5"
Jekyll also cited and repeated much of FalkkZnd v. Bertie and
151. Id.
152. A. FiTznmaEr, DE NATURA BPxvrum, supra note 57.
153. 2 P. Wins. at 118-19, 24 Eng. Rep. at 664.
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referred to Tenham and Barret.'15 4 The court evidently granted
custody to Justice Eyre.'6 5
IV. THE CASES AFrmR BEAuFORT AwD Em
Beaufort and Eyre were breakthroughs. 156 Broadly, Beaufort
had established that chancery could make orders against testa-
mentary and socage guardians whenever the chancellor felt the
infant would suffer without such regulation. The court could at
least regulate education and if the guardian misbehaved so as
to possibly prejudice the infant, the court could remove him.
Broadly, Eyre had established that chancery need not wait for
a "proper bill." Upon any petition, if the need were shown, the
chancellor would act, because the chancellor acted for the king,
who was "parens patriae."
For thirty years, the court's orders grew broader in scope but
were limited to testamentary and socage guardians. In Goodall
v. Harris,'7 a testamentary guardian was removed by Lord
King because the guardian had committed a breach of trust in
marrying his ward to his son, the son having no estate and being
apprenticed to a peruke-maker. In Smith V. SMmith,158 Lord
154. The case referred to is Teynham v. Lennard, 4 Brown Parl. Rep. 302,
2 Eng. Rep. 204 (H.L. 1724), reported below as Reynolds v. Tenham, 9
Mod. 40, 88 Eng. Rep. 302 (Ch. 1722). The report is a mere summary of the
arguments of counsel and the disposition by the House. The argument of
counsel supporting a testamentary guardianship in Tenham concluded as follows:
"[A]ll these matters had been fully heard and determined by the Lord Chan-
cellor, who was entrusted with the exercise of that part of the prerogative of
the Crown, which concerned the guardianship of the persons and estates of
infants, and to whom, by the law of the land, it belonged to appoint guardians."
4 Brown Parl. Rep. at 305, 2 Eng. Rep. at 207. Teynham may have been
decided April, 1724? Eyre was decided May 15, 1724.
155. When speaking to another issue, Jekyll also said the following: "This
Court has the Care, but not the Guardianship of Infants." 2 P. Wms. at 117,
24 Eng. Rep. at 664. It has already been noted that "guardianship" implied
a greater degree of control by the court than did "care." See note 43 supra.
Of course, both in Beaufort and in Eyre the Court said it could regulate
education and could remove guardians for misbehavior. "Guardianship" also
implied a greater reach of cases, since "guardianship" had no historic bounds
once the king no longer had wards. On the other hand, "care" had always
been limited to cases properly before the court because there was an estate
issue the chancellor could adjudicate upon or there was an accounting. Of
course, Beaufort was a case in which, while there was a will, there was no
dispute as to it and there was no financial interest in the testamentary guardian.
See text following note 132 sup'ra. No distinction between "guardianship" and
"care" was ever dearly maintained.
156. Eyre has usually been given as authority for chancery's jurisdiction
over the persons and property of infants. See J. STORY, supra note 47, at
§ 1333; 4 J. PoMEaoY, supra note 47, at § 1304.
157. 2 P. Wms. 561, 24 Eng. Rep. 862 (Ch. 1729). See Ex Parte Champney,
1 Dick. 350, 21 Eng. Rep. 304 (Ch. 1762) (guardian appointed where testa-
mentary guardian declined guardianship).
158. 3 Atk. 304, 26 Eng. Rep. 977 (Ch. 1745). See Roach v. Garvan, 1
Dick. 88, 21 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch. 1747) (same).
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Hardwicke ordered the enamored Mr. Barry not to marry the
ward of a testamentary guardian without leave of court. His
Lordship also ordered Mr. Barry to produce all letters contain-
ing promises of marriage. In Ex parte Whitfield,'59 Lord Hard-
wicke questioned his authority to allow a maintenance for a ward
of a guardian in socage. Sir Joseph Jekyll had done so twice,
but his Lordship questioned whether Jekyll had done so properly
without some cause pending before him. However, upon being
shown Tenham, and Barret,160 Lord Hardwicke concluded that
guardians who were strangers were not to be trusted very much.
His Lordship should have been shown Beaufort and Eyre.
In 1756, the case of Butler v. Freeman came before Lord Hard-
wicke.1' 1 A father had put his infant son into the care of
another for his education. Several persons seduced the infant
away and had him married. The father brought a petition to
hold the seducers in contempt of court. The seducers argued
that since the infant's father was still alive, the court could not
be his guardian. His Lordship answered that the court was not
acting through guardianship. Rather the court "has a general
right delegated by the Crown, as pater patriae, to interfere in
particular cases, for the benefit of such who are incapable to
protect themselves."1 62 Lord Hardwicke added that there need
only be a suit "relative to the infant or his estate" 163 for the
court to act.
The case thus adopted the broad Eyre principle that any
petition alleging harm to an infant would suffice for jurisdic-
tion. But the use of "parens patriae" did something more. Eyre
could legitimately be said to be limited to infants who were
ivards. Butler allowed the court to interfere even though the
infant's father was alive.
In 1790, in Creuze v. Hunter,16 4 a mother asked the court to
restrain her husband from interfering in his son's education.
The son was entitled to a considerable estate under the will of
his grandfather. A marginal note in Cox's Reports says that
case concerned a ward of the court. But the court did not say
159. 2 Atk. 330, 26 Eng. Rep. 592 (Ch. 1742).
160. See note 152 supra. See also notes 13 and 136 supra.
161. Amb. 301, 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (Ch. 1756).
162. Id. at 302, 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (Ch. 1756).
163. Id. at 303, 27 Eng. Rep. 205.
164. 2 Cox 242, 30 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ch. 1790). See Wilcox v. Drake 2 Dick.
631, 21 Eng. Rep. 473 (Ch. 1784) (same); ex parte Warner 4 Bro. Ch. Rep.
101, 29 Eng. Rep. 799 (CI. 1792) (same).
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it did. Lord Thurlow, however, "was of opinion that this Court
had arms long enough to reach such a case, and prevent a parent
from prejudicing the health or future prospects of the child."' 65
In 1817, Shelley v. TWestbrooke'6 6 came before the court. It
appeared that the poet Shelley had deserted his wife and had
cohabited with another. His wife took the children and went to
her father's. The wife subsequently died, and Shelley petitioned
for custody. It was alleged that Shelley had published a book
which had "blasphemously derided the truth of the Christian
revelation, and denied the existence of a God as creator of the
universe."O67 The court thought Shelley's opinions were im-
moral and vicious, and therefore concluded that it would not be
justified in delivering the children to Shelley for their education.
A master was ordered to recommend under whose care the in-
fants should remain during their minority. 68  Quaere whether
Shelley should have brought a suit for custody in chancery
rather than habeas corpus at Law .169
Finally, in 1827, Lord Eldon decided Wellesley v. The Duke
of Beaufort.170 It seems that a Mr. Wellesley was having an
affair with a Mrs. Bligh. Mrs. Wellesley, as a consequence, took
her children to her uncle's. Not long thereafter, she died. Mr.
Wellesley brought habeas corpus against his sisters-in-law, who
had custody of the children. The sisters-in-law in turn brought
a petition in chancery to prevent his prosecution of the writ.
The court was compelled to face the issue of its jurisdiction to
detain the children from their father. Lord Eldon's opinion, in
relevant part, was as follows:
With respect to the doctrine that this authority [to
make an order in the instant kind of case] belongs to
the King as parens patriae, exercising a jurisdiction by
this Court, it has been observed at the Bar, that the
Court has not exercised that jurisdiction, unless there
was property belonging to the infant to be taken care of
165. Id. at 243, 30 Eng. Rep. at 113.
166. Jac. 266, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (C. 1817).
167. Id.
168. See Whitefield v. Hales, 12 Ves. 492, 33 Eng. Rep. 186 (Ch. 1806).
Cf. DeManneville v. DeManneville, 10 Ves., Jr. 52, 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch.
1804) ; Ball v. Bal, 2 Sim. 35, 57 Eng. Rep. 703 (Ch. 1827).
169. See Rex v. Demanneville, 5 East 221, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804);
Ex parte Skinner, 9 Moore 278 (C.P. 1824) ; Rex. V. Greenhill, 4 Ad. & Ell.
624, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836). But see Blisset's Case, Lofft 748, 98 Eng.
Rep. 899 (K.B. 1831); Commonwealth v. Nutt, 4 Browne (Pa. C.P. 1810).
170. 2 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827).
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in this Court. Now, whether that be an accurate view
of the law or not; whether it is founded on what Lord
Hardwicke says in the case of Butler v. Freeman, 'that
there must be a suit depending relative to the infant or
his estate,' (applying, however, the latter words rather
to what the Court is to do with respect to the mainte-
nance of infants) ; or whether it arises out of a necessity
of another kind, namely, that the Court must have
property in order to exercise this jurisdiction: -that
is a question to which, perhaps, sufficient consideration
has not been given. If any one will turn his mind at-
tentively to the subject, he must see that this Court has
not the means of acting, except where it has property to
act upon. It is not, however, from any want of juris-
diction that it does not act, but from a want of means
to exercise that jurisdiction; because the Court cannot
take on itself the maintenance of all the children in the
kingdom.1'7
Lord Eldon's case authority was Beaufort . Berty.172 He also
cited Oreuze v. Hunter 73 and DeManneviZle v. DeManneille.
1'74
Lord Eldon verbalized what the court had come to do after
ButZer v. Freeman.175 The requirement that a proper bill be
before the court through which it could make orders with respect
to infants thus had been abandoned, carrying with it the neces-
sity that the infants be wards. The insertion of "parens patriae"
in Eyre and its use in Butler had made the transition relatively
easy. The expression now not only signified the special care the
court could give to infants who were properly before it but also
implied the court could properly bring infants before it to give
them special care.17
6
Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort went to the House of
Lords and is commonly cited as Wellesley v. Wellesley.177 Lord
Redesdale spoke to the issue of jurisdiction at great length. His
opinion, in part, was as follows:
171. Id. at 20-21, 38 Eng. Rep. 243.
172. See text following note 132 supra.
173. See text following note 161 supra.
174. See note 165 supra.
175. See text following note 158 supra.
176. See notes 43 and 153 supra. "Parens patriae" had been similarly used
to bring before the court many charities over which it had no statutory juris-
diction. See text between notes 88 and 103 supra.
177. 2 Bligh, N.S. 124, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L. 1828).
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What is the ground on which the opposition is made
to this order? The opposition is founded on the right
of the father to have the care and custody of his children.
That right is not disputed by the order; but the ques-
tion is, whether the father having that right, is to be at
liberty to abuse that right. That is the real question.
Why is the parent entrusted with the care of his chil-
dren? Because it is generally supposed he will best
execute the trust reposed in him; for that it is a trust,
of all trusts the most sacred, none of your Lordships can
doubt ....
We find that now, for a hundred and fifty years, the
Court of Chancery has assumed an authority with re-
spect to the care of infants ....
Now, upon what does Lord Somers, upon what does
Lord Nottingham, upon what does Lord Hardwicke,
upon what ground does every Chancellor who has been
sitting on the bench, in the Court of Chancery since
that time, place the jurisdiction? They all say, that it
is a right which devolves to the Crown, as parens
patriae, and that it is the duty of the Crown to see that
the child is properly taken care of ....
It is said, that there is nothing from which this juris-
diction can be inferred as belonging to the Court, except
the dicta that may be found in books, and the actual
exercise of it for one hundred and fifty years by persons
who have sat in the Court of Chancery. If we look back
to the constitution of the government of this country,
there are many things which we cannot ascertain. Will
any of your Lordships tell me how there comes to be a
House of Commons and a House of Lords? I cannot
tell ....
... If it were necessary to go back into times long
past, to examine the grounds on which every law is ad-
ministered, we should be involved in very great difficul-
ties. But what has been the practice for a great number
of years, has been held, not in this country alone, but in
all countries, to be a ground for supposing that it was
rightly done, on this supposition, that if it had been
wrongfully done, it would not have been permitted to
be continued.'7 s
178. Id. at 128-36, 4 Eng. Rep. at 1080-83.
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